The main aim of this article is to describe central elements of, and the relationships among, three interrelated domains of inquiry. The first domain is Charles Peirce's semiotic theory which offers five concepts of special relevance to the other two domains: primary components of the triadic sign, including the object, representamen, and interpretant; the unceasing process of semiosis, or continuous growth of the developing sign; the three forms of inference, of which Peirce's notion of abduction is of special interest; the (...) element of surprise in experience, and the universal categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness that ground Peirce's overarching theory. The second domain incorporates the discipline of psychosemiotics, which is defined as the study of how we learn, understand, and use the signs of culture. The article outlines the nature and scope of psychosemiotics and emphasizes its grounding in Peircean semiotics, meaning‐making, and the five concepts listed above. The claim will be made that signs, semiosis, and meaning act through the seven signways outlined in the article and thereby bind the individual into the surrounding physical and cultural environments. The third domain is formal education, for which implications are presented as derived from Peircean theory and viewed through the psychosemiotic lens. In this perspective, all forms of education are semiotic processes grounded in signs and meaning‐making. Further, formal education consists of learning a wide variety of culturally‐valued signs by way of the seven signways and through processes that often differ from a technocratic, standards‐driven, accountability‐oriented approach to learning and instruction. (shrink)

Without systems of public, external symbols for recording information, nonliterate communities have to rely on human memory for the retention and transmission of cultural knowledge. Religious expressions either evolved in directions that rendered them memorable or they were--quite literally--forgotten. Most religious systems, including all of the great world religions, emerged among populations that were mostly illiterate (even if there was a literate elite). Thus, it should come as no surprise that religious systems and ritual systems, in particular, have evolved so (...) as to exploit variables that facilitate memory. No doubt, the invention of literacy ameliorates these variables' influence, however, the availability of such cultural tools neither eliminates that influence nor even surmounts it. Experimental psychologists have clarified variables that contribute to extraordinary recall for events that arise in the normal course of life. Probably, the most obvious is frequency. Experiencing events of the same type frequently aids memory for that type of event, though not necessarily for the details of any of the particular instances of that type. When Jains carry out the Puja ritual day after day, they become adept at its performance. Although they are fluent with the ritual's details, it is possible that they do not remember even one of their previous performances distinctively. (shrink)

Only we must guard against this—not to strain our voice too roughly when conscious of a full stomach or sexual intercourse or physical fatigue. Many politicians and sophists experience this, being induced to engage in competitive debates, some through considerations of glory and ambition, others for pay or political contests. Thus our fellow citizen Niger, when a professional sophist in Galatia, happened to have swallowed a fishbone. But as another sophist had appeared on the scene from abroad and was engaged (...) in declaiming, Niger, fearful that he give the impression of having yielded to the newcomer, himself gave public performances, although the fishbone was still stuck in his throat. A serious and persistent inflammation in consequence developing, as he could not endure the pain, he submitted to a deep surgical incision from without. The fishbone was then removed through the wound site but thereafter the wound itself, becoming troublesome and purulent, caused his death. (shrink)

Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...) out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects, , and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. Contributors include George Bealer, Peter Forrest, John Foster, Grant Gillett, Bob Hale, Michael Lockwood, George Myro, Nicholas Nathan, David Smith, Steven Wagner, Ralph Walker, and Richard Warner. (shrink)

A philosophical exploration of the origin and limits of the modern world.

What is faith? Lara Buchak has done as much as anyone recently to answer our question in a sensible and instructive fashion. As it turns out, her writings reveal two theories of faith, an early one and a later one (or, if you like, two versions of the same theory). In what follows, we aim to do three things. First, we will state and assess Buchak’s early theory, highlighting both its good-making and bad-making features. Second, we will do the same (...) for her later theory, noting improvements on the early one. Third, we will mark various choice points in theorizing about faith, and we will argue for specific choices at those points, culminating in what we regard as a better, alternative theory of faith. Our critical aims, therefore, are ultimately constructive. By theorizing about faith with Lara Buchak, we aim to contribute to our common understanding of what faith is. (shrink)

Critical notice of Images of Science by P. M. Churchland and C. A. Hooker.

What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just pick up in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about what (...) this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism. Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4 considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have grappled with the question over the last fifty years. (shrink)

For those with advanced life-limiting illness, the optimization of quality of life and avoidance of nonbeneficial treatments at the end of life are key ethical concerns. This article evaluates the efficacy of an Interdisciplinary Ethics Panel (IEP) approach to decision making at the end of life for unbefriended nursing home residents who lack decisional capacity and have advanced life-limiting illness, through the use of a ninestep algorithm developed for this purpose. We reviewed the outcomes of three quality-of-care phased initiatives conducted (...) in our facility, a large public nursing home in New York City, between June 2016 and February 2020, which indicated that this IEP approach promoted advance-care planning, as palliative measures were endorsed to optimize quality of life for this vulnerable population at the end of life. We also examined another quality-of-care initiative when this IEP approach was applied to end-of-life decision making for nursing home residents who had a surrogate during the COVID-19 pandemic. This application appeared to be beneficial in adding more residents to our Palliative Care Program while it improved rates of advance-care planning. When all of the above findings are considered, we believe this novel IEP approach and algorithm have the potential to be applied elsewhere after appropriate assessment. (shrink)

In Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science are found a dynamist reduction of matter and an account of the communication of motion by impact. One would expect to find an analysis of the causal mechanism involved in the communication of motion between bodies given in terms of the fundamental dynamical nature of bodies. However, Kant's analysis, as given in the discussion of his third law of mechanics (an action-reaction law) is purely kinematical, invoking no causal mechanisms at all, let alone (...) dynamist mechanisms, in the explanation. It is argued that the reason for the non-incorporation of Kant's theory of matter in the account of impact is his overriding desire to provide a mathematical framework to explain the communication of motion, a provision which Kant felt to be impossible in the context of a metaphysical dynamism. (shrink)

The Vatican’s position on in vitro fertilization (IVG), found in the ’Instruction on Bioethics’ (1987), is that all IVF is immoral, for it violates the normative procreative act of married spouses. The dilemma created is, if all instances of IVF are immoral, then God’s act in the Incarnation (granting the traditional doctrine) must also have been immoral. Conversely, if God’s act in the Incarnation was not immoral, then at least some cases of human IVF are not immoral either. A resolution (...) is offered. Two diagrams are employed. (shrink)

Mark Lloyd Taylor in God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner charges that Rahner’s understanding of the essential immutability of God renders his theology incoherent. For Taylor, Rahner’s assertion of God’s essential immutability prevents him from cartying through in a consistent manner the methodological turn to the subject which is at the heart of his theological project. An assessment of the validity of Taylor’s process-informed critique requires a careful examination of Rahner’s understanding of analogy. Analogy, for (...) Rahner is not based on a conceptual or semantic distinction but on the ontological constitution of human transcendence. From Rahner’s perspective, Taylor’s critique is faulty because it springs from an impoverished view of Being and a diminished sense of the radical nature of human transcendence. While Taylor’s critique does not undermine Rahner’s position, it alerts one to the propensity of his position to generate substantialized interpretations and, at times, Rahner’s own tendency to dissolve too quickly dialectical tensions within his position. (shrink)

I argue for a version of "ought" implies "can". In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima facie ought to do A at T', then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T'. In support of this principle, I have argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought to do some alternative (...) action - such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent cannot fulfill both. (shrink)

It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It also appears to be essential to the state of belief that (...) to believe is to believe true. This is not just a contingent fact about our ordinary psychology, since even a non-ordinary believer must believe a proposition that they believe to be true. Nor is the idea that one may accept a theory as empirically adequate rather than as true a counter-example, since such acceptance combines belief in the truth of the observational claims of a theory with suspension of belief with respect to the non-observational claims of a theory. Nor is the fact that to believe is to believe true to be explained in terms of an inference governed by the T-scheme from the belief that P to the belief that P is true, since there is no inference from the former to the latter. To believe that P just is to believe that P is true. (shrink)

Her importance seems to hinge on the fact that she is both a symbol and a historical reality.

This book is about questions that one would hesitate to ask in certain groups, because the questioning itself would mark him or her as an outsider, or a liberal, or a conservative, or a reactionary interested in resurrecting issues which have been satisfactorily settled. But Western philosophy, jump-started by the Socratic dialogues memorialized by Plato, has traditionally concerned itself with reexamining meanings and values that many thought settled once and for all. In this book the interlocutors, who disagree about almost (...) everything, nevertheless search for areas of agreement as they continue in this Socratic tradition. (shrink)

This paper brings Sellars’ synoptic vision of philosophy into contact with elements of Quine’s naturalism. The implications of the synoptic view for the method of analysis are presented. Sellars’ metaphysical naturalism is supplemented with the meta-philosophical and epistemological naturalism of Quine. The issue of epistemic normativity is addressed within a naturalistic context. The possibility of a conflict between naturalism and realism is considered.

The studies comprising this volume, most of them appearing for the first time in English, deal with some of the main topics in Maimonides? philosophy and that of his followers in Provence. At the heart of these topics lies the issue of whether they adopted a completely naturalistic picture of the workings of the world order, or left room for the volitional activity of God in history. These topics include divine law, creation, the Account of the Chariot, prophet and sage, (...) Mosaic prophecy, reasons for the commandments, and prayer. Special attention is paid to three lesser known but highly significant Provenȧl Jewish thinkers: Moses Ibn Tibbon, Levi ben Avraham, and Nissim ben Moses of Marseille. (shrink)

This is an accessible and practical introduction to formal semantics for students new to the subject. Features: * Shows how meanings are built up and interrelated * Provides a progression of exercises with answers at the back of the book * Backs up activities with short, clear explanations * Includes a glossary of technical terms and an appendix on sets and functions.

In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response (...) to epistemic relativism. In this paper, I outline this particularist response to relativism, and provide further commentary on the relationship between naturalism and particularism. In addition, I set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to relativism and G. E. Moore’s defense of an external world. (shrink)

This article examines how discussions around the new interdisciplinary research area combining neuroscience and education have brought into sharp relief differences in the philosophies of learning in these two areas. It considers the difficulties faced by those working at the interface between these two areas and, in particular, it focuses on the challenge of avoiding 'non-sense' when attempting to include the brain in educational argument. The paper relates common transgressions in sense-making with dualist and monist notions of the mind-brain relationship. (...) It then extends a brain-mind-behaviour model from cognitive neuroscience to include a greater emphasis on social interaction and construction. This creates a tool for examining the potentially complex interrelationships between the different learning philosophies in this emerging new field. (shrink)

What is the relation between method and truth? Are we justified in accepting a theory that satisfies the rules of scientific method as true? Such questions divide realism from anti-realism in the philosophy of science. Scientific realists take the methods of science to promote the realist aim of correspondence truth. Anti-realists either claim that the methods of science promote lesser epistemic goals than realist truth, or else they reject the realist conception of truth altogether. In this paper, I propose a (...) realist theory of the relation between method and truth. The theory consists of three basic elements: (a) a naturalistic treatment of epistemic normativity, (b) an instrumentalist conception of the nature of methodological rules, and (c) an abductive argument for the truth-conduciveness of the rules of scientific method. (shrink)

¿La ciencia otorga conocimiento de la realidad? En este artículo ofrezco una respuesta positiva a esta pregunta. Rechazo la pretensión anti-realista según la cual somos incapaces de adquirir conocimiento de la realidad; al contrario, apoyo la visión realista que afirma que la ciencia produce conocimiento del mundo externo. Pero: ¿cuál mundo es ese? Algunos sostienen que la ciencia conduce a la superación de nuestra visión del mundo dada por el sentido común. El sentido común es la “metafísica de la edad (...) de piedra” que debe rechazarse como la teoría falsa de nuestros primitivos ancestros. Contra tales eliminativistas acerca del sentido común, planteo que la ciencia conserva y explica la experiencia del mundo dada por el sentido común. Aunque la ciencia puede llevar a la superación de creencias profundamente arraigadas, el sentido común refleja un nivel de experiencia más básico y duradero. Las creencias del sentido común son creencias bien confirmadas que se justifican por su papel en la acción práctica exitosa de la vida diaria. El sentido común otorga una base sólida sobre la cual establecer el enfoque realista a la ciencia. -/- . (shrink)

A developmental study of free-classification behavior within the age range of 3-1/2 to 19 years indicates that categorical responses, which are characteristic of adult behavior, increase with age while overgeneralized responses, classifications including noncategorical instances, decrease with age. Overdiscriminated responses which are incomplete categorical classifications increase from 3-1/2 to 6 years and then decrease to 19 years of age. These results are discussed within a two-stage theory of conceptual development (Kendler, 1971).

Within bioethics, two prevailing approaches structure how we think about the role of medical surrogates and the decisions that they must make on behalf of incompetent patients. One approach views the surrogate primarily as the patient's agent, obediently enacting the patient's predetermined will. The second approach views the surrogate as the patient's custodian, judging for herself how to best safeguard the patient's interests. This paper argues that both of these approaches idealize away some of the ethically relevant features of advance (...) care planning that make patient preferences so inscrutable and surrogate decision-making so burdensome. It proposes a new approach to surrogate decision-making, the Fiduciary Agency Approach. On this novel approach, the surrogate has authority to not only act on the patient's behalf as the patient's agent but also to decide on the patient's behalf as the patient's fiduciary. One upshot of this new approach is that surrogates must sometimes go against the expressed dictates of the patients' advance directives not necessarily because doing so would be in the patient's best interest but rather because doing so would best represent the patients' will. (shrink)

Proposals for a universal basic income have reemerged in public discourse for a variety of reasons. Marx’s critique of exploitation suggests two apparently opposed positions on a basic income. On the one hand, a basic income funded from taxes on labor would appear to be exploitative of workers. On the other hand, a basic income liberates everyone from the vulnerable condition in which one is forced to sell one’s labor in order to survive, and so seems to be one way (...) of abolishing exploitation at its root. This paper will develop a conception of exploitation that resolves the conflict in favor of basic income. The conception of exploitation is grounded in a liberal egalitarian conception of justice rather than in Marx’s labor theory of value or an exclusive focus on the worker-capitalist relation. This position is not premised on an acceptance of the basic institutions of capitalism, but rather is a standpoint from which to evaluate them. It is not necessary to downsize our ideas of freedom and equality. But it is less obvious than it appeared in classic Marxist formulations that socialism is necessary for social justice. To quote the title of a famous article, there could be a ‘capitalist road to communism’, if a substantial basic income is feasible in a capitalist society. (shrink)

Interval Temporal Logic is a finite-time linear temporal logic with applications in hardware verification, temporal logic programming and specification of multimedia documents. Due to the logic's non-elementary complexity, efficient ITL-based verification tools have been difficult to develop, even for propositional subsets. MONA is an efficient implementation of an automata-based decision procedure for the logic WS1S. Despite the non-elementary complexity of WS1S, MONA has been successfully applied in problems such as hardware synthesis, protocol verification and theorem proving. Here we consider a (...) rich propositional subset of ITL, PITL, whose expressive power is equivalent to that of WS1S, and in turn to that of regular languages. PITL not only includes operators such as chop, star and projection, but also past operators such as previous, chop in the past and since. We provide an interpretation of PITL formulas in WS1S, which led us to a direct translation from PITL formulas to MONA specifications. We present the tool PITL2MONA as an implementation of such translation. With PITL2MONA acting as a front-end, MONA is used as a decision procedure for PITL. To our knowledge, this is one of the few implementations of a decision procedure for PITL, the first one based on automata, and the only one which handles both projection and past operators. We have tested our implementation on a number of examples; we show in this paper the application of PITL and its MONA-based decision procedure in solutions to the dining-philosophers and a multimedia synchronisation problem, together with some experimental results on these and some other examples. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to document Laudan's rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory (...) of method. This is an important stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodology. (shrink)

We examined disgust and fear responses to spiders in spider-distressed and nondistressed individuals. Undergraduate participants (N = 134) completed questionnaires concerning responses to spiders and other potentially aversive stimuli, as well as measures of disgust sensitivity, anxious arousal, worry, and anhedonic depression. In addition, we obtained self-report and facial expressions of disgust and fear while participants were exposed to a live tarantula. Both spider distressed and nondistressed individuals reported disgust and exhibited disgust facial expressions in response to a tarantula. Disgust (...) in response to spiders was not found to be part of a general disgust response to all negative stimuli, nor was it due to a general negative emotional response to spiders. Emotional responses to spiders were differentially associated with scores on personality and psychological functioning measures. The results of this study provide evidence that spiders have a specific disgust-evoking status in both distressed and nondistressed populations. (shrink)